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Background and aims: The “process-model” of self-control proposes that the ego-depletion effect is better explained
by a switch between interest in “have-to” labor and cognitive “want-to” leisure, rather than being mainly due to a
decrease in cognitive resources, as advanced by the “strength-model” of self-control. However, it is currently difﬁcult
to disentangle the “process-model” from the “strength-model” of self-control. Here, we employed a stepwise
approach, featuring three studies, for testing the process model of self-control. Methods: In Study 1, we created a list
of 30 self-control events for characterizing “have-to” conducts in the daily life. In Study 2, mental visualization of
effortful self-control events (“have-to”) and monetary risk-taking (“want-to”) were employed for testing the strength-
model of self-control. In Study 3, to test the process-model of self-control, participants were simply required to read
self-control (or neutral) sentences. Results: Study 1 provided evidence regarding external validly for the list of self-
control events. Study 2 showed that mental visualization of effortful self-control events increases subsequent
monetary risk-taking. Study 3 highlighted that the brief apparition of a self-control-related sentence was sufﬁcient for
increasing risk-taking. These patterns were evidenced in the trial with the less advantageous gain/loss ratio.
Discussion: Altogether these ﬁndings support the process-model of self-control in showing that triggering the
semantic content of a “have-to” conduct, without its actual execution, is sufﬁcient for modulating subsequent “want-
to” activity. Conclusion: These ﬁndings could contribute to advancing current knowledge on how the high
availability of ready-to-consume rewards in modern environments is redeﬁning humans’ self-control ability.
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INTRODUCTION
Self-control refers to one’s capacity to favor his or her
abstract and distal goals when they are threatened by
competing concrete and proximal goals (Baumeister,
Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Baumeister, Vohs,
& Tice 2007; Fujita, 2011; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone,
2004). This requires from the individual the effortful over-
ride of thoughts, emotions, or impulses associated with
inappropriate behaviors that produce strong immediate
rewards, so that he or she could engage in behaviors that
are consistent with desirable long-term goals that are often
less rewarding in the near future (Baumeister et al., 2007).
Baumeister’s inﬂuential strength-model advances that
self-control restraint relies on a limited resource equated
with a muscle (Baumeister et al., 1998, 2007). This model
posits that engaging in self-control quickly consumes one’s
limited resource or energy leaving him or her in a state of
“ego-depletion.” Consequently, when individuals engage in
an effortful activity at Time 1, ability to exert self-control
temporarily diminishes and consequently performance on a
different task at Time 2 typically deteriorates (for meta-
analyses, see Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010).
Crucially, in this depleted state, further self-control attempts
are prone to fail, as demonstrated across situations. For
example, self-control efforts at Time 1 result in a higher
tendency for eating unhealthy food (e.g., Baumeister et al.,
1998; Salmon, Adriaanse, Fennis, De Vet, & De Ridder,
2016), taking ﬁnancial risks (Fischer, Kastenmüller, & Asal,
2012; Macrae et al., 2014; Schmeichel, Harmon-Jones, &
Harmon-Jones, 2010), or at pursuing impulsive choices
(Blain, Hollard, & Pessiglione, 2016; Nolet, Rouleau,
Benbouriche, Carrier Emond, & Renaud, 2015).
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Inzlicht and colleagues recently challenged the strength-
model of self-control by questioning the fact that ego-
depletion is exclusively induced by a short-term loss of
mental energy (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012; Inzlicht,
Schmeichel, & Macrae, 2014). This theoretical account
instead proposes a “process-model,” which advances the
idea that self-control failure is less about resource deple-
tion, but more about the switching of task priorities from a
“have-to” (i.e., tasks that are carried out through a sense of
duty or contractual obligation and are often difﬁcult to
execute) to a “want-to” goal (i.e., tasks that are psycho-
logically and physically enjoyable and/or easy to perform;
Hockey & Earle, 2006; Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012;
Inzlicht et al., 2014; Kiesel et al., 2010). As such, ego-
depletion should reﬂect individuals’ effort at maintaining a
balance between cognitive labor and cognitive leisure
(Inzlicht et al., 2014; also see Goldfarb & Henik, 2014;
Kool & Botvinick, 2014). In this context, ego-depletion
stems from the individual tendency to switch from men-
tally demanding tasks to more rewarding (or less effortful)
activities. Accordingly, it has been shown that effortful
cognitive control is intrinsically aversive (Botvinick, 2007;
Kool & Botvinick, 2014; Kool, McGuire, Rosen, &
Botvinick, 2010) and less frequently used when low-effort
cognitive strategies (Goldfarb & Henik, 2007, 2013) or
alternative beneﬁcial habits (Duckworth, Gendler, &
Gross, 2016; Galla & Duckworth, 2015) can be used.
Offsetting this pattern, increasing motivation or prepara-
tion to perform effortful mental activities decreases their
averseness and counteracts the desire for cognitive leisure
(Alberts, Martijn, & de Vries, 2011; Converse & Deshon,
2009; Kiesel et al., 2010; Kool et al., 2010; Muraven &
Slessareva, 2003; Moller, Deci, & Ryan, 2006).
However, these ﬁndings do not necessarily preclude the
possibility that ego-depletion could also be due to a diminu-
tion of cognitive resources. Indeed, both decreases in self-
control abilities after effortful self-control activity (i.e., the
strength-model of ego-depletion) and in the motivation to
engage in further effortful work (i.e., the process-model of
ego-depletion) could contribute to the modulation of perfor-
mance on subsequent tasks (e.g., Dang, Xiao, & Dewitte,
2014). Hence, current ﬁndings do not allow to disentangle the
“process-model” from the “strength-model” of self-control.
Here, we present the results of three studies that can serve as a
basis for doing so. As such, this study can serve as a
springboard for future research that aimed at reﬁning and
setting boundaries for the aforementioned theories.
In Study 1, we created a list of 30 self-control events
that should characterize “have-to” conducts in the daily life
of college students (i.e., behaviors that require effortful
control in order to reach valuable goals; see Galla &
Duckworth, 2015; Imhoff, Schmidt, & Gerstenberg,
2014). The objective of Study 1 was to demonstrate
sufﬁcient external validity of the list of self-control
events, before using these items in Studies 2 and 3.
Speciﬁcally, because self-control has often been negatively
associated with impulsivity (e.g., Johnson, Carver, Mulé,
& Joormann, 2013; Miller et al., 2009; Tsukayama,
Duckworth, & Kim, 2012, 2013), we expect the average
scores of frequency and difﬁculty of daily-life self-control
events to be associated with the UPPS [urgency,
premeditation (lack of), perseverance (lack of), sensation
seeking] Impulsive Behavior Scale and its four dimensions
(Whiteside & Lynam, 2001).
Next, in Study 2, we used the self-control events from
Study 1 to test the strength-model of self-control (i.e., Study 2
was not designed to differentiate between the strength-model
and the process-model). Speciﬁcally, mental visualization of
effortful self-control events (“have-to”) and monetary risk-
taking (“want-to”) were employed for inducing effortful
activity at Time 1 and for assessing task performance at
Time 2, respectively (Carr & Steele, 2010; Fischer et al.,
2012; Macrae et al., 2014; Schmeichel et al., 2010). The
mental visualization of effortful events was employed for
inducing effortful activity at Time 1 based on previous
research that used comparable methods for simulating self-
control (e.g., Macrae et al., 2014). Indeed, mental simulations
(e.g., reﬂection on running) trigger the same sensorimotor
processes that operate during the actual execution of the
imagined activity (Moulton & Kosslyn, 2009). Hence, just as
self-control can be used in real time to prevent an unwanted
outcome (Wegner, 1994), it can be simulated ofﬂine through
the mental imaginary of the self-control events (Wilson,
2002). It follows that ego depletion effects could also arise
from the imagination of effortful self-control events at Time 1
(Macrae et al., 2014). Another main aspect of study 2 is that
we used monetary risk-taking (i.e., gambling) as an index of
“want-to” activity, that is, an equivalent to doing something
that is easier or more pleasurable activity. This selection was
based on previous studies that used monetary risk-taking as a
leisure conduct that could produce strong immediate rewards
(Carr & Steele, 2010; Schmeichel et al., 2010), and showed
that participants spent more money after they undertook self-
control-related conducts. We hypothesized that as compared
to mental simulations of neutral events, the imagination of
effortful self-control (at Time 1) would increase monetary
risk-taking (at Time 2).
Finally, based on the ﬁndings from the ﬁrst two studies,
Study 3 aimed at testing the process-model of self-control.
Speciﬁcally, we employed the same procedure as in Study 2,
with one exception: participants were simply required to
read self-control (or neutral) sentences. This procedure was
used to examine whether triggering the semantic content of
daily-life self-control events could increase monetary risk-
taking. We hypothesized that as compared to reading neutral
events, the brief reading of sentences describing effortful
self-control (at Time 1) would increase monetary risk-taking
(at Time 2). Findings supporting this assumption would be
in line with the process-model of self-control in showing
that triggering the semantic content of a “have-to” conduct,
without its actual enactment, is sufﬁcient for modulating
subsequent “want-to” activity.
STUDY 1 – METHODS
Participants
Sixty-seven undergraduate students (19–33 years of age;
mean= 20.83, SD= 2.87; 54 males) were recruited from
the Faculty of Motor Science of the Université Libre de
Bruxelles (ULB).
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Measures
Daily-life self-control behaviors. Based on Imhoff et al.
(2014), a list of 30 common daily-life behaviors requiring
self-control were created. It contained events in which
individuals have to either resist a short-term temptation
(e.g., “to study instead of going out with friends”) or
undertake short-term effort in order to reach long-term goals
(e.g., “to stretch thoroughly after a run;” see full list of
sentences in Table 1). For each sentence, we assessed the
frequency and difﬁculty of the behavior by asking: “How
often do you undertake the following behavior?” on a scale
from 1 (never) to 5 (very often), and “How difﬁcult is it for
you to undertake the following behavior?” on a scale from 1
(not at all) to 5 (a lot), respectively. Participants were asked
not to provide difﬁculty ratings for behaviors that they have
never undertaken (by circling “not applicable;” see also
Table 1 for the percentage of “not applicable” answers for
each item, across all participants).
Trait self-control. Participants completed the 13-item of
the French version of the Brief Self-Control Scale (BSCS;
Brevers, Foucart, Verbanck, & Turel, 2017; Tangney et al.,
2004). Items (e.g., “I am good at resisting temptation”) were
endorsed on a 5-point scale, where 1= not at all like me and
5= very much like me. Cronbach’s α was .81. Consequent-
ly, an average scale score was calculated (with higher scores
indicating better self-control).
Impulsivity. We assessed self-reported impulsivity using
the French version of the UPPS (Van der Linden et al., 2006).
The UPPS captures four dimensions (subscales) of impulsivity
using 45 items: “urgency,” deﬁned as the tendency to experi-
ence strong reactions under the condition of intense negative
affect; “lack of premeditation,” describing a tendency not to
consider the consequences of an act before engaging in that
act; “lack of perseverance,” encapsulating inability to remain
focused on a task that may be boring and/or difﬁcult; and
“sensation seeking,” capturing a tendency to prefer and pursue
activities that are stimulating or exciting coupled with open-
ness to trying new and unconventional experiences.
Ethics
All procedures performed in studies involving human par-
ticipants were in accordance with the 1964 Helsinki Decla-
ration and its later amendments or comparable ethical
standards. Each participant gave informed consent to the
experimental procedure, which was approved by the insti-
tutional review board of ULB.
Table 1. Self-control cue events used in the experiments
Items
Frequency Difﬁculty
% NAsM SD M SD
To study instead of going out with friends 3.06 1.10 2.98 1.24 2.99
To buy a fruit instead of a candy 3.49 1.16 2.20 1.15 11.95
To study instead of going on the Internet 3.17 1.02 3.26 1.14 1.49
To study instead of watching a TV show 3.03 1.09 2.98 1.25 7.47
To go to bed early instead of going out with friends 3.15 1.21 2.56 1.22 4.48
To go running despite bad weather 2.48 1.42 2.80 1.51 26.87
To go to bed early instead of watching a TV show 2.81 1.37 2.62 1.44 10.45
To chose a healthy meal instead of a tasty but fatty meal 3.58 1.04 2.51 1.18 0.00
To buy water instead of a soda 3.91 1.20 1.78 1.05 4.48
To buy food for cooking instead of a ready-to-eat meal 4.00 1.30 1.81 1.09 5.98
To decide to turn down a cigarette offer 3.53 1.64 1.88 1.40 32.84
To decide not to drink alcohol at a party 2.37 1.27 2.76 1.42 28.36
To decide to turn down a dessert offer 2.90 1.37 2.24 1.25 31.46
To decide to postpone my cigarette break 1.93 1.45 1.63 1.12 67.16
To go to class instead of going out for a drink 3.36 1.48 2.04 1.14 10.44
To go exercising instead of going out with friends 3.19 1.13 2.60 1.06 7.46
To do some cleaning instead of watching TV 3.09 1.22 2.35 1.11 7.46
To take notes in class instead of daydreaming 3.21 1.13 2.83 1.14 0.14
To decide to take out the clean dishes from the dishwasher 3.43 1.28 1.96 1.13 13.43
To decide to renew my public transport monthly pass 2.68 1.39 1.62 1.01 11.94
To resist eating a plate with meat 2.30 1.40 2.32 1.41 47.76
To classify documents instead of going on the Internet 2.92 1.22 2.44 1.21 0.06
To take out my pet instead of watching TV 1.96 1.46 1.31 0.74 88.08
To make my lunch instead of buying a sandwich 2.99 1.23 2.78 1.27 16.41
To wake up instead of pressing the “snooze” button 3.30 1.36 2.27 1.24 10.44
To pay attention in classes instead of talking with friends 3.11 1.46 3.31 1.62 17.91
To thoroughly stretch after a run 3.32 1.09 2.91 1.21 0.29
To take the stairs instead of the elevator 3.55 1.27 2.25 1.26 7.46
To wait until dinner before eating 3.56 1.27 2.00 1.02 7.46
To decide to read a book instead of going on the Internet 3.21 1.26 2.70 1.32 8.95
Note. Frequency and difﬁculty scores are taken from Study 1 only. All item scores ranged between 1 (minimum) and 5 (maximum).M: mean,
SD: standard deviation. % NAs: percentage of “not applicable” answers for each item (across all participants from Study 1, N= 67).
1046 | Journal of Behavioral Addictions 7(4), pp. 1044–1055 (2018)
Brevers et al.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The frequency (Cronbach’s α= .76) and difﬁculty (α= .86)
aspects of daily-life self-control behaviors were sufﬁciently
consistent across 30 events on the list. We therefore aver-
aged scores across 30 items to obtain mean scores of
frequency and difﬁculty of typical self-control behaviors
(see Table 1 for means and standard deviations of frequency
and difﬁculty ratings for each of the 30 items.). Pearson’s
correlation between these two scales was negative and
signiﬁcant, r(67) =−.42, p< .001.
Moderate correlation coefﬁcients were observed between
the index of frequency of daily-life self-control, lack of
perseverance [r(67)=−.36, p< .05], and urgency [r(67)=
−.31, p< .05], indicating that the higher the frequency of
daily-life self-control behaviors, the lower the lack of perse-
verance and level of urgency. No signiﬁcant correlations were
observed between the index of frequency of daily-life self-
control and trait self-control, r(67)= .15; self-reported scores
of lack of premeditation, r(67)=−.15, ns; and sensation
seeking, r(67)= .03, ns. Several moderate to large correlation
coefﬁcients were observed with the index of difﬁculty of
daily-life self-control behaviors, indicating that the higher the
difﬁculty of daily-life self-control behaviors, the lower
trait self-control, r(67)=−.41, p< .01, and the higher
self-reported scores of urgency, r(67)= .44, p< .01; lack of
premeditation, r(67)= .33, p< .05; and lack of perseverance,
r(67)= .49, p< .01. All p values were adjusted for multiple
comparisons with Bonferroni correction.
Altogether, these ﬁndings suggest that the index of
difﬁculty of daily-life self-control behaviors has a higher
level of face validity than the index of frequency, as it
correlates with the BSCS and three UPPS subscales. There-
fore, the index of difﬁculty was used in Studies 2 and 3 for
selecting individualized self-control behaviors.
In addition, an exploratory correlation analysis revealed
moderate to large correlation coefﬁcients between trait
self-control and impulsivity, indicating that the higher
trait self-control was, the lower the self-reported scores
of impulsivity [urgency: r(67) =−.51, p< .001; lack of
premeditation: r(67)=−.38, p< .01; lack of perseverance:
r(67) =−.61, p< .001; and sensation seeking: r(67)=−.47,
p< .001] were. This pattern is consistent with both the
theoretical approach of self-control and previous ﬁndings
on the relationships between impulsivity and trait self-
control (e.g., Johnson et al., 2013; Miller et al., 2009;
Tsukayama et al., 2012, 2013).
STUDY 2 – METHODS
Participants
Eighty undergraduate students (different from those who
participated in Study 1) were recruited from the Faculty of
Motor Science of the ULB. Participants were randomly
assigned to the neutral (n = 40) or self-control (n = 40)
gambling task conditions (see Table 2 for participants’
characteristics.). This sample size was matched to the
highest sample size used in previous studies examining
the impact of ego-depletion on ﬁnancial risk-taking
(Schmeichel et al., 2010).
Measures
Selection of cue events.
Self-control condition. Cue events for this condition were
selected from the list of 30 self-control behaviors detailed
in Study 1. Speciﬁcally, ﬁve sentences were selected,
based on the highest score of difﬁculty obtained from a
preliminary session in order to individualize cue events
presented to each participant.
Neutral condition. Cue events used in the neutral condi-
tion were sentences referring to daily-life objects that do
not involve any direct action from the individual
(e.g., “an ofﬁce table that includes two chairs” and “a
building that has ﬁve ﬂoors”). The neutral sentences were
the same across all participants. The list of sentences is
given in Table 3.
The gambling task and experimental conditions.We used
a Coin-Flipping Task adapted from Carr and Steele (2010).
Participants were presented with ﬁve coin-toss trials
featuring the following gain/loss ratios: 6(gain)/2(loss)
[expected value (EV)= 2], 6/3 (EV= 1.5), 6/4 (EV= 1),
6/5 (EV = 0.5), or 6/6 (EV= 0). Each trial was divided into
three stages: cue event presentation, gamble presentation,
and gamble decision. Importantly, the ﬁve trials were pre-
sented in the following EV-centered succession order: 6/2
(EV= 2), 6/5 (EV = 0.5), 6/6 (EV= 0), 6/4 (EV = 1), and
6/3 (EV = 1.5). This was done to prevent choices from being
driven by the anticipation of trial-order succession that
might induce, for instance, strategic, or sequential patterns
of decision-making in some participants.
Cue event presentation. After having pressed the space
bar of the keyboard, participants ﬁrst viewed a short
sentence on the computer screen during 4 s and had to
read it carefully. After 4 s, a black screen appeared and
the participants were instructed to close their eyes for 30 s
and to visualize themselves undertaking the behavior
from their own viewpoint (i.e., “to see the event through
your own eyes”). A “beep” sound (length= 1 s) signaled
them to open their eyes. Five sentences describing self-
control events were presented to participants from the
self-control group conditions. Five sentences describing
simple motor actions were presented to participants in the
neutral condition.
Gamble presentation and decision. Participants were
offered a 50% chance of winning 6€ and a 50% chance
of losing an amount of money that varied between 2€ and
6€ (EV ranging from 2 to 0). No gamble featured
negative EVs. During this stage, participants had to
choose to gamble or not, using “Yes” and “No” buttons
on each side of the screen. The gambles were not played.
Hence, no reward/loss feedback was given to the parti-
cipants during the gambling task.
Materials. The Coin-Flipping Task (Figure 1A) was
programed and ran using E-Prime (v. 2.0.1; Psychology
Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA). The
task was presented on a 13-in. computer screen viewed from
a distance of approximately 0.5 m. Participants responded to
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each trial by pressing one of two buttons on a keyboard,
which paralleled buttons on the screen. The choices were to
take or not to take the gamble.
Dependent measures. The proportion of “Yes/No” re-
sponse for each trial was used in order to examine level of
gambling acceptance at each gain/loss ratio.
Control measures
Gambling acceptance tendency/predispostion. Participants
had to rate on a 5-point scale (ranging from 1= never to
5= always), whether they would agree to gamble with
their own money in a coin-ﬂipping game, with the follow-
ing gain/loss ratios: 6(gain)/2(loss), 6/3, 6/4, 6/5, or
6/6. A scale score was calculated as the mean of all items;
higher scores indicated higher subjective level of gambling
acceptance predisposition.
Motivation for money.We asked participants to report the
frequency with which they would pick a 0.20€ coin from
the street on a 5-point scale, where 1= never and
5= always (Sescousse, Redouté, & Dreher, 2010).
Trait self-control. Participants completed the BSCS
(Tangney et al., 2004).
Impulsivity. The French version of the UPPS (Van der
Linden et al., 2006) was administered.
Problem gambling and gambling frequency.We used the
20-item South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS; Lesieur &
Blume, 1987) to evaluate participants’ gambling-related
behavior and problems. The SOGS is a widely used
screening instrument for problem gambling and has been
Table 3. List of sentences used in the experiments for the neutral
condition (Studies 2 and 3)
A building that contains ﬁve levels
An ofﬁce table that contains two chairs
An elevator that goes up to the second ﬂoor
A sheet of paper ﬁlled with text
A room painted in white
Table 2. Sample characteristics for the neutral and the self-control conditions in Studies 2 and 3
Neutral condition Self-control condition
Study 2
n 40 40
Proportion of male/female 17/23 18/22
Age 23.08 (5.96) 24.13 (5.09)
Weekly budget (in euros) 50.00 (35.00, 70.00) 60.00 (30.00, 90.00)
SOGS frequency 2.00 (2.00, 4.00) 2.00 (0.00, 5.00)
SOGS budget (in euros) 3.00 (3.00, 3.00) 3.00 (1.00, 4.00)
SOGS severity 0.00 (0.00, 1.00) 0.00 (0.00, 1.00)
Gambling acceptance 3.20 (2.65, 3.60) 3.10 (2.25, 3.55)
Motivation for money 3.00 (2.00, 5.00) 2.00 (2.00, 4.00)
SCL total score frequency 3.20 (0.48) 3.26 (0.80)
SCL total score difﬁculty 2.49 (0.54) 2.48 (0.66)
BSCS 2.50 (0.50) 2.56 (0.37)
UPPS urgency 26.71 (4.83) 27.60 (5.16)
UPPS lack of premeditation 20.12 (5.06) 20.48 (4.29)
UPPS lack of perseverance 17.77 (3.60) 19.08 (3.59)
UPPS sensation seeking 32.67 (7.39) 33.20 (6.61)
Study 3
n 40 40
Age 21.53 (2.71) 23.30 (5.24)
Male/female 16/24 18/22
Weekly budget 37.50 (25.00, 67.50) 55.00 (36.25, 80.00)
SOGS frequency 2.00 (1.00, 4.00) 2.50 (1.00, 4.00)
SOGS budget 3.00 (1.00, 3.00) 3.00 (1.00, 3.00)
SOGS severity 0.00 (0.00, 1.00) 0.00 (0.00, 1.00)
Gambling acceptance 3.20 (2.65, 3.60) 3.30 (2.40, 3.75)
Motivation for money 3.00 (2.00, 4.00) 3.00 (2.00, 5.00)
SCL total score frequency 3.09 (0.46) 3.00 (0.53)
SCL total score difﬁculty 2.58 (0.48) 2.35 (0.37)**
BSCS 2.38 (0.38) 2.30 (0.48)
UPPS urgency 28.21 (5.02) 27.83 (6.47)
UPPS lack of premeditation 22.08 (4.65) 23.56 (4.78)
UPPS lack of perseverance 19.69 (4.38) 20.71 (3.91)
UPPS sensation seeking 33.36 (5.60) 35.00 (6.41)
Note. Mean and standard deviation (in brackets) are reported for age, SCL scores, BSCS, and UPPS subscales. Median and 25th and 75th
percentiles (in brackets) are reported for weekly budget, SOGS scores, gambling acceptance, and motivation for money. SOGS: South Oaks
Gambling Screen; SCL: self-control list; BSCS: Brief Self-Control Scale; UPPS: UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale.
**p value< .01, p values were not corrected for multiple comparisons.
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shown to be valid and reliable in community and clinical
samples (Lesieur & Blume, 1987). A total SOGS score of
5 or higher was used to classify participants as probable
pathological gamblers or not (scores between 1 and 4 on
SOGS typically indicate some problems with gambling;
Lesieur & Blume, 1987).
Procedure
Preliminary session. Participants ﬁrst provided informed
consent and were assured of the anonymity of their answers.
They then ﬁlled-out questions capturing demographic
information, rated the 30 self-control behaviors on
frequency and difﬁculty, and completed measures of gam-
bling acceptance predisposition and motivation for money.
This session was undertaken collectively, approximately
1-week prior to the laboratory session. Participants received
no information on the gambling task featured in the labora-
tory session.
Laboratory session. Participants were individually tested
in a quiet room located at the research unit of the Psycho-
physiology of Movement at the Faculty of Motor Science of
the ULB. Participants ﬁrst received informed consent and
task instructions (speciﬁc to their group condition) for the
Coin-Flipping Task. All participants received similar task
instructions that featured one practice trial in order to
Figure 1. (A) An illustration of a trial from the gambling task used in Study 2. (B) An illustration of a trial from the gambling task
used in Study 3
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familiarize them with the task. The term “SENTENCE” was
displayed during the cue event presentation of the practice
trial. In other words, we did not use either neutral or self-
control sentences during the practice trial in order to give
similar instructions to participants from the two groups.
Importantly, participants were informed that the task includ-
ed only ﬁve trials and that they had a ﬁfty-ﬁfty chance to win
6 € or to lose a speciﬁc amount that varied across trials. They
were then told that a lottery followed the gambling task.
During the lottery, participants had to randomly pick one
ball (out of ﬁve) containing a trial number (i.e., from 1 to 5).
The loss or reward corresponded to (a) the participant’s
decision (to gamble or not) during the gambling task on this
speciﬁc trial and (b) the amount featured in the speciﬁc trial.
If the participant decided not to gamble during this trial, they
received 6€. If participants decided to gamble on a trial, they
had to ﬁrst decide between “head” or “tail,” and then the
experimenter ﬂipped a coin. Depending on the result of this
gamble, the winning or losing amount featured on the trial
was added to or withdrawn from the 6€ payoff. Hence,
participants were remunerated between 0€ and 12€. This
procedure was undertaken in order to ensure that partici-
pants’ responses were consistent with their true preferences.
After being informed of the lottery procedure, partici-
pants performed the gambling task, played the lottery game,
and completed the UPPS and SOGS questionnaires. Parti-
cipants were then remunerated and thanked for their partici-
pation (see Figure 2 for a depiction of the experimental
procedure.).
Data analyses
Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to
examine between-groups (neutral vs. self-control) differ-
ence effect on control measures with normal distributions
(the UPPS subscales and the BSCS). Mann–Whitney U tests
were used to examine between-group differences in control
measures with non-normal distributions (weekly budget,
SOGS gambling frequency, SOGS problem gambling
severity, SOGS gambling budget, motivation for money,
and gambling acceptance predisposition). Independent
sample t-tests were used for comparing the neutral and the
self-control groups on mean scores of frequency and difﬁ-
culty on the list of 30 self-control behaviors. McNemar’s
tests were used to examine within-group differences in the
proportion of accepted or refused gambles according to the
type of trial. Finally, χ2 tests were performed to examine
the proportion of participants (between the neutral and the
self-control group) who accepted or refused the gamble,
separately for the ﬁve trials of the gambling game. All
p values were adjusted for multiple comparisons with
Bonferroni correction.
Ethics
All procedures performed in studies involving human
participants were in accordance with the 1964 Helsinki
Declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical
standards. Each participant gave informed consent to the
experimental procedure, which was approved by the insti-
tutional review board of ULB.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Characteristics of study participants
MANOVA revealed that participants from the self-control
and the neutral groups did not differ on UPPS subscales and
BSCS [Pillai’s trace value= 0.08, F(5, 73)= 0.63, p= .27].
Moreover, all pairwise comparisons (Fisher’s least signiﬁ-
cant difference) revealed p values > .12. Mann–Whitney
U tests revealed that participants from the self-control
and the neutral groups did not differ on weekly budget
(U= 706.50, Z=−0.54, p= .59), SOGS gambling frequen-
cy (U= 708.50, Z=−0.71, p= .48), SOGS problem gam-
bling severity (U= 762.00, Z=−0.21, p= .83), SOGS
gambling budget (U= 773.50, Z=−0.07, p= .95), motiva-
tion for money (U= 681.00, Z=−1.18, p= .24), and gam-
bling acceptance predisposition (U= 720.50, Z=−0.77,
p= .44).
Regarding the list of 30 self-control behaviors, the self-
control and neutral groups did not differ in self-control
difﬁculty, t(78)= 0.60, p= .74 and self-control frequency,
t(80) = 0.74, p= .71.
Gambling acceptance (see Table 2 for
descriptive statistics)
McNemar’s tests revealed that the proportions of gambles
differed between all gambling game trials (all p< .01),
except for between the 6(gain)/5(loss) and the 6/6 trials
(p= 1.00; Figure 3A). χ2 tests revealed that, as compared
with the neutral group, a higher proportion of the
self-control group accepted the gamble in trials featuring
the 6/6 and 6/4 ratios, χ2(1, N= 80)= 13.87, p< .001;
χ2(1, N= 80)= 8.21, p= .02, respectively (Figure 3A).
No between-group differences were observed in the 6/2,
6/3, and 6/5 trials of the gambling game (all p> .83;
Figure 3A).
Altogether, results from Study 2 are in line with the
literature (e.g., Macrae et al., 2014) in showing that mental
visualization of effortful self-control events (as compared to
neutral situations) increases subsequent gambling
acceptance.
Figure 2. Experimental procedure – Studies 2 and 3
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STUDY 3 – METHODS
Participants
A new sample of 80 undergraduate students was recruited
from the Faculty of Motor Science of ULB. Participants
were randomly assigned to the neutral (n= 40) or self-
control (n= 40) gambling task conditions.
Measures
Selection of cue events. We used the same methods of cue
events selection as in Study 2.
The gambling task and experimental conditions. This
task was similar to that employed in Study 2, expect for the
cue event presentation stage. Speciﬁcally, participants
viewed ﬁve sentences on the computer screen, each for
4 s (Figure 1B). They were instructed to read (and quietly to
themselves) each sentence carefully. In the self-control
group condition, sentences focused on self-control events,
and in the neutral condition, sentences focused on simple
motor actions.
Materials, dependent measures, and control measures.
We used similar materials, dependent measures, and control
measures as in Study 2.
Procedure
Preliminary session. We used a similar procedure to those
used in Study 2.
Laboratory session. This task was similar to this
employed in Study 2, except for task instructions: for each
trial of the Coin-Flipping Task, participants were instructed
to read the sentence instead of visualizing themselves
undertaking the behavior (as in Study 2).
Data analyses
MANOVA was used to examine between-group (neutral vs.
self-control) differences effect on control measures with
normal distributions (the UPPS subscales and the BSCS).
Mann–Whitney U tests were used to examine between-
group difference on control measures with a non-normal
distribution (weekly budget, SOGS gambling frequency,
SOGS problem gambling severity, SOGS gambling budget,
motivation for money, and gambling acceptance predispo-
sition). McNemar’s tests were used to examine the between-
group differences in the proportion of accepted or refused
gambles according to the type of trial. Finally, χ2 tests were
performed to examine the proportion of participants who
accepted or refused the gamble, separately for the ﬁve trials
of the gambling game. All p values were adjusted for
multiple comparisons with Bonferroni correction.
Ethics
All procedures performed in studies involving human par-
ticipants were in accordance with the 1964 Helsinki Decla-
ration and its later amendments or comparable ethical
standards. Each participant gave informed consent to the
experimental procedure, which was approved by the insti-
tutional review board of ULB.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Characteristics of study participants (see Table 2 for
descriptive statistics)
MANOVA revealed that participants from the self-control
and neutral groups did not differ on UPPS subscales and
BSCS [Pillai’s trace value= 0.04, F(5, 73)= 0.66, p= .43].
Moreover, all pairwise group comparisons (Fisher’s least
signiﬁcant difference) revealed p values > .17. Mann–
Whitney U tests revealed that participants from the self-
control and the neutral groups did not differ on weekly
budget (U= 600.50, Z=−1.93, p= .06), SOGS gambling
frequency (U= 784.00, Z=−0.16, p= .88), SOGS problem
gambling severity (U= 746.50, Z=−0.61, p= .54), SOGS
gambling weekly budget (U= 786.50, Z=−0.14, p= .89),
motivation for money (U= 735.50, Z=−0.64, p= .52),
and gambling acceptance predisposition (U= 778.50,
Z=−0.21, p= .64).
Figure 3. (A) Proportion of gamble accepted in each trial of the
gambling task for the self-control and the neutral groups, in
Study 2. (B) Proportion of gamble accepted in each trial of the
gambling task for the self-control and the neutral groups, in Study
3. p values are being reported for χ2 tests between the neutral and
the self-control group, separately for the ﬁve trials of the gambling
game. All p values were adjusted for multiple comparisons with
Bonferroni correction. *p< .05. ***p< .001
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Regarding the list of 30 self-control behaviors, partici-
pants from the neutral group reported higher mean scores of
self-control difﬁculty, as compared to participants from the
self-control group, t(80)= 2.47, p= .01. No difference
was observed in the mean score of self-control frequency,
t(80)= 0.62, p= .50.
Gambling acceptance
McNemar’s tests revealed that the proportions of gambling
choice differed between all trials of the gambling game
(all p< .001), except between the 6(gain)/5(loss) and the
6/6 trials (p= .07). Hence, with exception of the trials with
the two lowest EV, the higher the EV was, the higher the
level of gambling acceptance was (Figure 3B). χ2 tests
revealed that, as compared with the neutral group, a higher
proportion of participants in the self-control group accepted
the gamble in the trial featuring the 6(gain)/6(loss) ratio,
χ2(1, N= 80)= 7.44, p= .03 (Figure 3B). No between-
group differences were observed in the 6/2, 6/3 6/4, and
6/5 trials of the gambling game, all p> .83 (Figure 3B).
In sum, the results from Study 3 highlighted that the brief
apparition of a self-control-related sentence was sufﬁcient
for increasing the level of gambling acceptance. Notewor-
thy, participants from the neutral group reported higher
mean scores of self-control difﬁculty. This might have
lowered the impact of the experimental manipulation. Nev-
ertheless, this study design did not allow to examine this
research question (i.e., only sentences with higher levels of
self-reported difﬁculty were used in the gambling para-
digm). Further studies are thus needed to replicate this
study protocol with groups of participants who do not differ
on self-reported scores of difﬁculty to undertake daily-life
self-control behaviors. Another complementary alternative
would be to examine whether levels of difﬁculty of daily-life
self-control modulate the impact of self-control cues on
subsequent monetary risk-taking. For instance, one option
would be to implement three experimental conditions: one
featuring neutral sentences, one featuring self-control sen-
tences with a low level of self-reported difﬁculty, and one
featuring self-control sentences with a high level of self-
reported difﬁculty.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present paper describes the ﬁndings of three comple-
mentary studies that aimed at testing the process-model of
self-control. Study 1 demonstrated sufﬁcient external valid-
ity of a list of self-control events, which were then used in
Studies 2 and 3. Next, in line with the strength-model of
self-control (Baumeister et al., 1998, 2007), Study 2
highlighted that mental visualization of effortful self-control
events increased monetary risk-taking. Finally, Study 3
showed that simply reading sentences related to daily-life
self-control was sufﬁcient for increasing monetary risk-
taking. This last ﬁnding provides some support for the
process-model of self-control (Inzlicht & Schmeichel,
2012; Inzlicht et al., 2014) in showing that evoking the
content of a “have-to” conduct (i.e., daily-life self-control
routines), without its actual enactment, is sufﬁcient for
increasing the gravitation toward a “want-to” activity
(i.e., gambling). Importantly, in Studies 2 and 3, we ob-
served that the proportion of gambling acceptance was
signiﬁcantly increased in the trial featuring the less advan-
tageous gain/loss ratio [i.e., 6(gain)/6(loss)].
On the whole, the present ﬁndings could contribute in
advancing knowledge on how the high availability of ready-
to-consume rewards in modern environments is redeﬁning
humans’ ability of self-control. Speciﬁcally, tempting beha-
viors have never been so readily available, easy to engage
in, and difﬁcult to resist (e.g., Billieux, Schimmenti,
Khazaal, Maurage, & Heeren, 2015; Brevers & Noël,
2015). This also encompasses activities featuring mone-
tary-risk taking, such as sports betting. Indeed, with easy
access from a computer, tablet, or phone, it is possible to bet
everywhere, at every moment, such as before or during a
game in play, and while simultaneously using different
platforms (e.g., Brevers et al., 2018; Hing, Russell, Lamont,
& Vitartas, 2017; Marchica, Zhao, Derevensky, & Ivoska,
2016). Because it is currently possible to get access to and
repeat rewarding “want-to” conducts without engaging in
complex cognitive or physical processes, merely thinking of
effortful “have-to” conducts could increase gambling temp-
tation and risk-taking in a large range of individuals.
Interestingly, in Study 2, we observed higher levels of
gambling acceptance for the trial featuring the 6/6 gain/loss
ratios and also for the trial featuring the 6/4 ratios, but not for
the trial featuring the 6/5 ratio. This result might be an
artifact of the trial-order presentation (e.g., Brevers et al.,
2016; Kwak & Huettel, 2018). Speciﬁcally, in this study, the
ﬁve trials of the Coin-Flipping Task were presented in the
following EV-centered succession order (6/2, 6/5, 6/6, 6/4,
and 6/3). This procedure was adopted to prevent choices
from being driven by the anticipation of trial-order succes-
sion that might induce, for instance, strategic or sequential
patterns of decision-making in some participants. However,
this speciﬁc trial order might have induced conservative
choices in participants for the trial featuring the 6/5 gain/loss
ratio. Indeed, this trial directly followed the one with the 6/2
gain/loss ratio, that is, the trial featuring the highest level of
EV. Additional studies are thus needed to replicate ﬁndings
from Studies 2 and 3 by examining whether trial order can
impact the level of gambling acceptance.
One limitation of this study is that we only used gam-
bling (i.e., monetary risk-taking), as an index of “want-to”
activity, that is, an equivalent to doing something that is
easier or more pleasurable activity. This selection was based
on previous studies that used monetary risk-taking as a
leisure conduct that could produce strong immediate
rewards (Carr & Steele, 2010; Schmeichel et al., 2010),
and showed that participants spent more money after they
undertook self-control-related conducts. Nevertheless, for
some participants in this study, high-risk wagers might have
been ﬂagged as stressful, aversive, and possibly a cognitive
burden to undertake (as opposed to a more leisurely or less
cognitive-demanding activity). While groups of participants
did not differ in the control measures (e.g., self-reported
level of gambling acceptance tendency, motivation for
money, and gambling frequency), it is still desirable that
future research replicates this study with a sample of
gamblers, that is, individuals for which gambling is closely
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related to a “want-to” leisure/approach motivation activity.
Moreover, it has been highlighted that problem gamblers are
characterized by low-trait self-control (e.g., Bergen, Newby-
Clark, & Brown, 2012) and by disrupted sensitivity to
monetary loss and rewards (e.g., Brevers & Billieux,
2018; Brevers & Noël, 2013; van Holst, van den Brink,
Veltman, & Goudriaan, 2010). Hence, recruiting a sample of
gamblers, ranging from non-problem to high-problem gam-
bling, should allow to examine whether levels of trait self-
control sensitivity to loss and rewards could modulate the
impact of self-control cues on monetary risk-taking.
Future research should also examine whether comparable
increases of monetary risk-taking occur during simultaneous
self-control. Indeed, in contrast to sequential self-control
(which is used in this study), it has been shown that exerting
effortful self-control in one domain facilitates simultaneous
self-control performance in unrelated domains (Tuk, Zhang,
& Sweldens, 2015). This effect has been referred to as
“inhibitory spillover” (Berkman, Burklund, & Lieberman,
2009) or “transfer of cautiousness” (Verbruggen, Adams, &
Chambers, 2012). Speciﬁcally, when people engage in a
“have-to” task and inhibit a focal impulse, it facilitates the
inhibition of other impulses as well (e.g., proactive motor
response inhibition diminishes monetary risk-taking while
gambling; Stevens et al., 2015; Verbruggen et al., 2012).
Therefore, it would be interesting to examine whether the
onset of self-control-related sentences differently impact
monetary risk-taking when it is presented before (sequential
order) or during (simultaneously to) gambling.
Additional studies are also needed in order to test whether
the reading of self-control related sentences inﬂuence the
level of monetary risk-taking during a gambling task, fea-
turing a higher number of repeated gambling choices, and
with varying levels of gain–loss probability (e.g., the Cups
Task; Weller, Levin, Shiv, & Bechara, 2007). Indeed, in
this study, the Coin-Flipping Task only included a single
“Yes/No” response trial for each EV context. This might
have lowered the statistical power of the observed effects and
hampered direct comparisons of gambling acceptance across
gain/loss ratios. Moreover, all trials featured a similar
0.50 gain–loss probability. Hence, the present results may
not be generalizable to other gain–loss probability contexts.
Another limitation is that self-control sentences featured
different types of “have-to” conducts. For instance, “to buy
a fruit instead of a candy” involves health-related goals,
whereas “to study instead of going out with friends”
involves professional-related goals. Hence, future studies
should examine whether the type of “have-to” conducts
could differently impact the “want-to” conducts. Moreover,
in contrast to the self-control sentences, the neutral sen-
tences were not individualized. This might have lowered the
impact of the experimental manipulation. In addition, the
effects observed in the present studies could also be
explained by other processes that are not related to either
the process or strength models of self-control. For example,
when individuals mentally visualized daily-life self-control
or read self-control sentences, it might have triggered a
sense of overconﬁdence in the individual, so that they
brieﬂy believed that their choices (e.g., in the gambling
paradigm) were more likely to be right, even in riskier
circumstances. Further studies are needed to explore this
assumption. Finally, notwithstanding the effects revealed
herein, it remains to be seen whether imagined self-control
(as in Study 2) triggers effects on monetary risk-taking
comparable to actual execution of self-control behavior.
This issue merits further research.
In sum, we show that the viewing of sentences evoking
daily-life effortful self-control, as compared to viewing
neutral sentences, can increase subsequent monetary risk-
taking. These ﬁndings provide initial support for the
“process-model” of self-control, which posits that ego-
depletion can be induced by a switch of interest between
“have-to” and “want-to” conducts, rather than by a decrease
of cognitive resources.
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